Closing coal: economic and moral incentives

Paul Collier and Anthony Venables

Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2014, vol. 30, issue 3, 492-512

Abstract: Climate policy requires that much of the world’s reserves of fossil fuels remain unburned. This paper makes the case for implementing this directly through policy to close the global coal industry. Coal is singled out because of its high emissions intensity, low rents per unit value, local environmental costs, and sheer scale. Direct supply policy—the sequenced closure of coal mines—may lead to less policy leakage (across countries and time) than other policies based on demand or price management. It also has the advantage of involving relatively few players and leading to clear-cut and observable outcomes. Appropriately sequenced closure of the world coal industry could, we suggest, create the moral force needed to mobilize collective international action.

Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Closing coal: economic and moral incentives (2014)
Working Paper: Closing Coal: Economics and Moral Incentives (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxford:v:30:y:2014:i:3:p:492-512.

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