Consequences of Brexit for competition law and policy

John Vickers

Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2017, vol. 33, issue suppl_1, S70-S78

Abstract: If Brexit involves leaving the EEA, UK competition law will stand but come under strain as efficiencies of integrated policy are lost. For example, dual UK/EU scrutiny of international mergers will be needed. Scope for UK and EU competition law to diverge would open up, but that has costs as well as possible benefits. Merger policy should retain the competition foundations it now has, and not go back towards the politics of the ‘public interest’.

Keywords: antitrust; merger policy; Brexit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K21 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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