The EMU and the Control of Inflation

James Meade

Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 1990, vol. 6, issue 4, 100-107

Abstract: Proposals have been made for the institution of a European Central Bank or similar institution to conduct an independent monetary policy in terms of a single European Currency with the exclusive purpose of controlling the rate of price inflation, budgetary policies being left largely in the hands of national fiscal authorities. It is suggested in this note that such a divorce between a central monetary policy for the control of inflation and a set of national fiscal policies for the control of budget balances could lead to an unstable outcome. The conditions in which such instability may occur are examined. A more general case is made for not divorcing monetary policy from fiscal policy, and various methods of dealing with this problem are discussed. Copyright 1990 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1990
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxford:v:6:y:1990:i:4:p:100-107

Access Statistics for this article

Oxford Review of Economic Policy is currently edited by Christopher Adam

More articles in Oxford Review of Economic Policy from Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().