Antitrust Policy towards Co-operative R&D Ventures

Paul Geroski

Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 1993, vol. 9, issue 2, 58-71

Abstract: This paper surveys the theoretical literature on R&D cartels and the empirical literature on problems of appropriability in order to evaluate the case for encouraging antitrust authorities to treat R&D cooperative ventures leniently. The case for R&D cooperative ventures trades potential gains from internalizing technological spillovers off against a possible reduction in output market competition, but the empirical evidence suggests that R&D spillovers can easily be exaggerated. This suggests that the design of antitrust policy towards R&D cooperative ventures is likely to be of major importance if they are to yield net social gains, and the paper concludes with a critical examination of the NCRA introduced in U.S. and Block Exemption introduced in Europe in the 1980s. Copyright 1993 by Oxford University Press.

Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxford:v:9:y:1993:i:2:p:58-71

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