 Concentrated Ownership, State-Owned Enterprises and Corporate GovernanceErnest W K Lim Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2021, vol. 41, issue 3, 663-691 Abstract: Concentrated ownership companies are increasing worldwide, a significant percentage of which are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), whose controller is the government. Government owners are the world’s second largest type of shareholder. Despite extensive literature on SOEs, there is little analysis of how corporate governance can be undermined by the state as the controller of SOEs or how it can be deployed by the government to serve its own ends. This article critically examines how the conflict of interest between the government as the controller of SOEs on the one hand and the minority shareholders and stakeholders on the other, as well as the conflict of interest between the government as the controller on the one hand and the government as the regulator on the other, can affect three corporate governance regimes, namely, sustainability (environmental, social and governance) reporting; directors’ duty to act in the best interests of the company; and stewardship code. Keywords: concentrated ownership; controlling shareholder; state-owned enterprise (SOE); corporate governance (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxjlsj:v:41:y:2021:i:3:p:663-691. Access Statistics for this article Oxford Journal of Legal Studies is currently edited by Liz Fisher, Stefan Enchelmaier, Andreas Televantos, Liora Lazarus and Jennifer Payne More articles in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies from Oxford University Press |
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