Relational Wrongs and Agency in Tort Theory

Nick Sage

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2021, vol. 41, issue 4, 1012-1039

Abstract: —Some of those theorists who believe tort law consists of relational wrongs also believe, under the influence of Kant’s legal philosophy, that tort law is concerned for the agency of the two parties to a wrongful interaction. I argue that these theorists should discard their agency framework. It distorts our view of tort doctrine and does not really fit the law’s relational structure. We can reach a better understanding just by pursuing the idea that torts are relational wrongs. I try to diagnose and suggest cures for the intellectual tendencies that lead Kantian theorists away from this approach.

Keywords: civil recourse; corrective justice; fault; Kant; strict liability; tort theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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