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Are Boycotts, Shunning, and Shaming Corrupt?

Scott Altman

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2021, vol. 41, issue 4, 987-1011

Abstract: Boycotts, shunning, and shaming sometimes wrong their targets by offering corrupt incentives that undermine significant individual aims. These tactics unjustly harm targets when they aim to impede living authentically, deterring them from declaring their beliefs in public or pursuing important projects. They are corrupt because they make their targets willing participants in these harms. They subvert their targets’ ambitions not to allow money or social pressure to influence their most important actions. Although individuals must maintain their integrity, people also have a moral responsibility not to undermine those efforts. Not all uses of these tactics conflict with an anti-corruption norm. Many labour and consumer boycotts likely do not threaten authenticity. Other uses arguably pursue non-corrupt aims, such as punishment, norm reinforcement or non-complicity, threatening corruption only as an unintended consequence. Even as to these, several considerations weigh against using boycotts, shunning, and shaming. Using these techniques for punishment and norm reinforcement is often inappropriate in a liberal society. Some uses that appear to aim at non-complicity also aim at corrupting their targets. Finally, sometimes imposing a risk of unintended corruption wrongs those exposed to such risks.

Keywords: Corruption; Authenticity; Boycott; Shame; Shun (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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