Property, Analogy and Variety

Ben McFarlane and Simon Douglas

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2022, vol. 42, issue 1, 161-186

Abstract: How should a court respond if a party argues that, because her right to an intangible asset is a property right, the defendant is under a strict duty not to interfere with that intangible asset? Our view is that such a conclusion does not follow from the premise, and the argument is really one that the party’s right deserves protection as it is sufficiently analogous to a right to a tangible asset.

Keywords: property rights; intellectual property law; trusts; rights; legal reasoning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxjlsj:v:42:y:2022:i:1:p:161-186.

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