Linkage Arguments For and Against Rights

James Nickel

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2022, vol. 42, issue 1, 27-47

Abstract: This article is about relations of support and conflict within systems of fundamental legal rights—and the arguments for and against rights that those relations make possible. Justificatory linkage arguments defend controversial rights by claiming that they provide very useful support to the realisation of well-accepted rights. This article analyses such arguments in detail and discusses their structures, uses and pitfalls. It then shows that linkage arguments can be used not just to defend rights, but also to attack them. When rights conflict—whether severely or weakly, logically or practically—negative linkage arguments attacking them can be based on the trouble they make for other rights. Many examples of conflicts of rights are provided. Negative linkage arguments provide reasons for rejecting, repealing or trimming the criticised right. Such arguments are already in regular use, but their close relation to justificatory linkage arguments has not been recognised.

Keywords: Conflicts of rights; fundamental legal rights; human rights; indivisibility; linkage arguments; realisation of rights; realisation sensitivity; Henry Shue; support relations among rights (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxjlsj:v:42:y:2022:i:1:p:27-47.

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