 The Normativity of Law: Has the Dispositional Model Solved our Problem?*Andreas Vassiliou Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2022, vol. 42, issue 3, 943-962 Abstract: In Legal Directives and Practical Reasons, Noam Gur has presented a novel account, called the dispositional model, to explain how law bears on our normative practical reasons. Gur holds that his model is superior to the current models, namely the standard weighing model and Joseph Raz’s exclusionary model. Although his work provides useful insights into the practical impact of law, I argue that: (i) his challenge against the exclusionary model is valid only insofar as one accepts Raz’s normal justification thesis and dependence thesis; (ii) his argument against the weighing model misses its target, because it attacks the model as a decision-making method, not as an account of practical reason; and (iii) his dispositional model solely constitutes a decision-making strategy and does not offer a third alternative answer to the question of how law affects our normative practical reasons. Hence, the dispositional model is not a competitor to the weighing and the exclusionary model, and the problem of accounting for the normativity of law remains. Keywords: normativity; practical reasoning; legal theory; jurisprudence; legal philosophy; Raz (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxjlsj:v:42:y:2022:i:3:p:943-962. Access Statistics for this article Oxford Journal of Legal Studies is currently edited by Liz Fisher, Stefan Enchelmaier, Andreas Televantos, Liora Lazarus and Jennifer Payne More articles in Oxford Journal of Legal Studies from Oxford University Press |
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