Rousseau’s Republican Judges

Stephen Winter

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2023, vol. 43, issue 4, 826-847

Abstract: Judges occupy important roles in Rousseau’s constitutional theory. Placing the Social Contract alongside Rousseau’s lesser-known Letters Written from the Mountain and The Government of Poland, this article examines how Rousseau constructs judicial institutions and explores a problem he confronts. Although necessary for the republic to enjoy the rule of law, Rousseau worries that adjudicative bodies threaten the citizens’ freedom. This article describes Rousseau’s constitutional solution, which combines a conservative-yet-progressive legislative ethos, with pluralist institutionalism and judicial non-professionalism.

Keywords: Rousseau; judicial discretion; republicanism; freedom; mixed constitution; constitutional theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxjlsj:v:43:y:2023:i:4:p:826-847.

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