The Origin of Asymmetric Information: Revisiting the Rationale for Regulation

Gareth Downing

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2024, vol. 44, issue 1, 28-53

Abstract: Akerlof’s seminal model on asymmetric information forms the basis for a broad range of regulatory interventions aimed at addressing the adverse effects of unequal information between transacting parties. While a groundbreaking model of the effects of information asymmetries in markets, Akerlof’s model does not examine why information asymmetries emerge. This article argues that an examination of the underlying drivers and origins of information asymmetries revitalises the policy rationale for regulatory intervention.

Keywords: asymmetric information; regulation; law and economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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