(Mis)Governing World Football? Agency and (Non)Accountability in FIFA

E A Brett and Alan Tomlinson

Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2025, vol. 45, issue 1, 108-137

Abstract: We identify the variables that have enabled the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) to evade internal and external legal and juridical rules and processes, allowing it to prioritise the interests of its leaders and staff rather than its stakeholders. An interdisciplinary theoretical framework highlights the weaknesses of the legal systems, democratic processes, market mechanisms and regulatory regimes governing FIFA’s activities since its foundation. The historical processes transforming FIFA into a wealthy enterprise whose leaders could abuse their power with impunity are reviewed. An evaluation of the structural reforms introduced in 2016 following the exposure of FIFA corruption by US authorities in 2015 then shows how they have strengthened the internal and external rules and procedures enabling stakeholders to hold FIFA to account, whilst arguing that the reforms have not eliminated the leadership’s ability to ‘capture’ its democratic processes, exploit its monopolistic controls over lucrative contracts and evade regulatory controls.

Keywords: FIFA; corruption; internal sport law; external sport law (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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