Does Nature Need Rights?
Lael K Weis and
Robert Mullins
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 2025, vol. 45, issue 4, 839-871
Abstract:
Rights of nature (RoN) appear to provide a promising alternative to anthropocentric environmental rights. But do they meet the demands of transformative green constitutionalist projects? This article addresses that question by examining the juridical dimensions of RoN. We draw on empirical studies of RoN laws to identify and examine the challenges of redeploying ‘rights’ and ‘legal personality’—concepts associated with liberal normative frameworks—in the service of green normative theory and its fundamental concern for ecological well-being. We reject the dominant rights-based paradigm, which locates the green potential of RoN laws in constituting nature as a rights-bearing legal subject, and we propose an alternative: the governance paradigm. Our alternative locates the green potential of RoN laws in reconfiguring authority relations and supports ecocentric legal frameworks instead of RoN: emphasising ecocentric values and duties instead of rights, and ecological community membership instead of legal personhood.
Keywords: rights of nature; green constitutionalism; environmental constitutionalism; non-anthropocentric constitutionalism; ecocentrism; ecocentric duties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:oxjlsj:v:45:y:2025:i:4:p:839-871.
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