Ministers as policy intermediaries in presidential systems: evidence from a conjoint survey experiment
Don S Lee and
Min H Kim
Policy and Society, 2025, vol. 44, issue 4, 443-457
Abstract:
This study examines how ministers serve as policy intermediaries between the presidential office and government ministries. Drawing on the policy intermediary framework, we provide insights into the necessity of assessing ministers based on potential for policy intermediation that extends presidential influence. Specifically, we investigate what qualifications and characteristics in ministers should be prioritized as policy intermediaries through the perspective of presidential staffers in South Korea. Using a novel conjoint experimental design, we test how various ministerial attributes―their career background, political and civil service experience, demographic characteristics, and leadership and coordination styles―influence evaluations by 179 presidential staffers of 2,144 hypothetical ministerial profiles. The results indicate that experience constructed within the executive and legislative branches and political party is essential for a qualified policy intermediary. Moreover, ministers who can act in the interests of the president’s office, rather than those who represent the ministry’s interests, are perceived as desired policy intermediaries. Overall, this study contributes novel insights by providing rare access to presidential staff evaluations of ministerial capacities vis-à-vis effective policy intermediation between politics and administration.
Keywords: minister; policy intermediary; presidential office; conjoint experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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