Explaining regulatory intermediaries’ compliance through the accountability regimes framework

Eva Thomann

Policy and Society, 2025, vol. 44, issue 4, 474-492

Abstract: This article assesses how accountability relations between intermediaries, regulators, and regulatory targets affect intermediary non-compliance. Regulatory intermediary theory (RIT) maps how intermediaries, who are given responsibility but often lack hierarchical accountability to regulators, have multiple roles in the process of regulatory compliance. Intermediaries need to comply with the tasks that they have been delegated to perform. However, beyond acknowledging the importance of complex actor relations, RIT lacks a clear theory of how these relationships may affect the realization of regulatory intentions during policy implementation. This article introduces the accountability regimes framework (ARF) to model the multiple formal and informal roles of intermediaries, identify accountability dilemmas, and theorize the conditions under which they trigger intermediary non-compliance. The ARF is applied to study “Prevent Duty,” an anti-radicalization policy which requires social science lecturers in British universities to report students deemed at risk of radicalization to the Home Office. Semi-structured qualitative interviews conducted with intermediaries in May 2021 (N = 19) are analyzed using crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis. Results support the ARF’s core claims: in a politicized context of mandated, interpretive intermediation, the presence of multiple accountability dilemmas can trigger non-compliance, while their absence is related to compliance. Institutions can mitigate this intermediary non-compliance by providing training to intermediaries. Results additionally show that the mandated, politicized intermediaries may informally appropriate the regulator’s role of risk assessment. The ARF allows RIT scholars to understand intermediaries’ compliance as a problem of accountability.

Keywords: accountability regimes; prevent duty; regulatory intermediaries; compliance; Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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