Federalism and the European Parliament

Juliet Lodge

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 26, issue 4, 63-79

Abstract: The European Parliament has been a source of controversy since its inception. Its direct election was seen as endorsing a federal structure and political future for the European Community (later European Union). Changes in its authority and legislative powers were seen as symptomatic of creeping federalism and the emasculation of member states' national sovereignty. The European Parliament's conscious contribution to developing federalism and constructing a federal Europe relate to its direct election, its powers, and its proposals to hold a constitutional convention. The Anglo-Saxon misconception of federalism is analyzed, the role of a bill of rights examined, and the failures of democratic legitimacy exposed with a view to see what contribution federal bargains may make to close the democratic deficit and to impel a review of the current institutional arrangements. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

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