Effects of Constitutional and Political Controls on State Expenditures

James W. Endersby and Michael J. Towle

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 27, issue 1, 83-98

Abstract: State governments have employed various statutory and constitutional devices to limit government spending. Many of these devices are intended to increase executive control over expenditures. The research design employed here suggests that such efforts are ineffective or counterproductive. However, this research indicates that state legislatures controlled by a single party are more likely than divided legislatures to limit government spending and minimize debt. Thus, political and electoral influences appear to explain state expenditures belter than legal restrictions on the appropriations process. This study adds to the literature by simultaneously analyzing multiple restraints on state government spending and debt. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

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