State Government Influence in the National Policy Process: Lessons from the 104th Congress

John Dinan

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 27, issue 2, 129-142

Abstract: During the last several decades, state officials increasingly concluded that their interests are not adequately represented in national policymaking and sought to increase their influence through the constitutional amendment process, the federal judiciary, and the political process. This article evaluates the extent to which these institutional mechanisms were effective in advancing state interests during the 104th Congress. United States Constitutional amendments were improbable and ineffective devices. Litigation was slightly more successful, though it provided an uncertain source of long-term security for state interests. Efforts to work through the political process, either through securing the passage of legislation that increases congressional responsiveness or by engaging in direct lobbying, were moderately effective under certain conditions. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

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