Wealth, Power, and Attorney Regulation in the U.S. States: License Entry and Maintenance Requirements

Robert M. Howard

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 28, issue 4, 21-34

Abstract: This study examines the effect of economic power on state regulation of attorneys. Following the economic theory of regulation, the effect of various attorney wealth and power measures is analyzed in an attempt to explain the variance in attorney regulation throughout the 50 states. Using OLS regression, attorney wealth and power are found to be positively related to more regulation regarding entry barriers, but power and wealth lead to less state-sponsored regulation when such regulation has a negative economic effect on licensed attorneys. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

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