European “Federalism” and its Encroachments on National Institutions

Vivien A. Schmidt

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 29, issue 1, 19-44

Abstract: The European Union is a supranational governance organization that is more federal than unitary but which, instead of a constitutionally established balance of powers, exhibits a dynamic confusion of powers. This institutional structure has not only served to subordinate member-states' institutional structures, whether federal or unitary, and to alter their traditional balance of powers, it has also served to reduce national governmental autonomy in the name of a shared supranational authority, diminish national control over subnational units, and undermine democratic legitimacy at both the national and EU levels. It has had a differential effect on member states, with a greater disruptive impact on unitary states, such as France and Britain, than on federal states, such as Germany. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

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