Accountability Payoffs in Federal Systems: Competing Logics and Evidence from Europe's Newest Federation

William M. Downs

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 29, issue 1, 87-110

Abstract: Accountability has gained considerable currency in discourse on democratic representation, especially for heterogeneous societies having multilevel governance. Because federalism endows political systems with a range of institutional mechanisms for incorporating regional identities, building consensus, and protecting minority interests, a frequent contention is that it enhances democratic accountability. This article explores the relationship between federalism and accountability on three levels: (1) conceptual distinctions; (2) federation/non-federation comparisons; and (3) comparisons among federal variants. Federal/unitary comparisons reveal the limitations of a narrow interpretation of federalism as constitutionalism, with its presumption of federation as a guarantor of accountability. Comparing across federations, variation in accountability depends as much on the rules-in-use as it does on the constitution-in-form. The difficulties inherent in linking federalism with clear payoffs in terms of institutional and individual accountability are illustrated by developments in Western Europe's newest federation: Belgium. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

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