The Use of Administrative Discretion in Implementing the State Children's Health Insurance Program

Malcolm L. Goggin

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 29, issue 2, 35-52

Abstract: States have exercised administrative discretion in at least six different ways during the intergovernmental implementation of the State Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) provision of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997. States have used this flexibility to determine when to submit their plans and when to put the CHIP program into effect. After describing the problem of uninsured children in America and the politics of program adoption, multivariate analysis is used to attempt to answer the following question: Why have some states moved more quickly than others to get plans for introducing CHIP submitted, approved, and implemented? The nature and extent of a relationship between a state's economic, political, and health-need characteristics, on the one hand, and the timing of submission and implementation, on the other, are examined. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

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