Diffusion Pathways for Electricity Deregulation

Clinton J. Andrews

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 30, issue 3, 17-34

Abstract: Quantitative studies of the diffusion of policy innovations generally avoid cases where the appropriate governmental actor is ambiguous; this study focuses on just that context. An event-history analysis of U.S. electricity sector regulatory reforms involving both regulators and legislators between 1993 and 1999 is presented here. The interplay of branches and planes of government significantly influences this diffusion process, suggesting that diffusion researchers should more often focus explicitly on such dynamics. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

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