Fiscal Federalism in South Africa

Joachim Wehner

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 30, issue 3, 47-72

Abstract: The constitutional change in South Africa in the 1990s brought about the decentralization of substantial budgetary responsibility to newly created provincial governments. This study captures the new assignment of functions and resources to the different spheres of government in South Africa and provides an assessment on the basis of a framework derived from fiscal federalism principles. It concludes that there is a substantial congruence between what can be viewed as theoretically desirable and what is outlined in the South African Constitution of 1996, but observes significant divergences between the Constitution and actual practice. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/ (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:publus:v:30:y::i:3:p:47-72

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Publius: The Journal of Federalism is currently edited by Paul Nolette and Philip Rocco

More articles in Publius: The Journal of Federalism from CSF Associates Inc. Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().