From Constitutional to Treaty Federalism: A Comparative Perspective

Thomas O. Hueglin

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 30, issue 4, 137-153

Abstract: Federalism in the European Union differs significantly from the American model. First, instead of relying on fixed constitutional rights, the EU remains committed to a treaty-based process of flexible accommodation. Second, the federal system of constitutional power division has been replaced by the subsidiarity principle. The scope and dimension of Community action are tied to negotiated criteria of necessity and efficiency. Third, European federalism has not adopted the American senate model. Member-state participation in the decision-making process is based on the German model of weighted council representation. Regions and civic organizations have gained an additional consultative voice. As a novel type of federal polity, the EU may gain model character for a globalizing world of nation-states whose interests appear loosely interconnected by federal arrangements rather than firmly nested in a federal state. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

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