After Decentralization: Patterns of Intergovernmental Conflict in Argentina, Brazil, Spain, and Mexico

Alfred P. Montero

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 31, issue 4, 43-64

Abstract: Recent scholarship on the political determinants of decentralization has been useful for explaining initial decisions by national elites to decentralize, but the electoral independent variables favored by these analyses are insufficient to explain the complex process of decentralization over time. Distributional conflicts involving national chief executives and subnational governments occurring after decentralization is initiated shape the process in ways that alter initial conditions. This study assesses change in the degree, pattern, and pace of decentralization in four countries: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Spain. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

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