Federal Arrangements as a Peacemaking Device During South Africa's Transition to Democracy

Nico Steytler and Johann Mettler

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 31, issue 4, 93-106

Abstract: Federal arrangements are often used as a way of keeping deeply divided societies together. In particular, where divisions, be they ethnic, linguistic, or religious, develop in violent conflict or the threat of civil war, constitutional arrangements for self-rule and shared rule have been put forward as a key to peace. The federal distribution of power is then used to satisfy sectoral demands for self-determination. Copyright , Oxford University Press.

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