Short Circuit: Federal-State Relations in the California Energy Crisis

Mary M. Timney

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2002, vol. 32, issue 4, 109-122

Abstract: This article examines the changing roles of the federal and state governments in electricity regulatory policy, including the history of electricity regulation and the development of state and federal regulatory powers. The case of California suggests that deregulation has elevated the role of federal regulators and increased their responsibility to protect the interests of the states beyond those of the market. The inability of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to protect California from predatory market manipulation demonstrates the necessity for states to plan carefully to protect their multiple policy interests. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2002
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