 What Role Does the “Federalism Bonus” Play in Presidential Selection?Randall E. Adkins and Kent A. Kirwan Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2002, vol. 32, issue 4, 71-90 Abstract: The conflicting outcome of the electoral and popular votes in the 2000 presidential election provoked calls to abolish or alter the electoral college. One prominent criticism is that the institution distorts election outcomes by providing disproportionate influence to small states. If each state receives a number of presidential electors equal to that states' number of members in the U.S. House of Representatives plus the two senators, then the “federalism bonus” represents the two electoral college votes that correspond to the position of each state as an equal entity in the Senate. This research examines how the “federalism bonus” influences presidential selection by addressing three questions. First, why did the framers include a federal component in the electoral college? Second, under what circumstances has the “federalism bonus” played a role in presidential selection? Third, how would the various alternatives for reform affect the federal component of the electoral college, and what is the likelihood of adoption for each? Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press. Date: 2002 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:publus:v:32:y:2002:i:4:p:71-90 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Publius: The Journal of Federalism is currently edited by Paul Nolette and Philip Rocco More articles in Publius: The Journal of Federalism from CSF Associates Inc. Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK. |
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