Homogeneity and Democracy in Austrian Federalism: The Constitutional Court's Ruling on Direct Democracy in Vorarlberg

Anna Gamper

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2003, vol. 33, issue 1, 45-57

Abstract: This article seeks to analyze how homogeneity between the federation and the constituent Lander is provided by the Austrian federal Constitution in general. Focus is then put on a recent judgment of the Austrian Constitutional Court, which has been one of the most outstanding cases of the Court's “homogeneity jurisdiction.” The Court held a provision of a Land constitution to be in breach of the federal Constitution and therefore repealed it. The reason given was that the provision, which had obliged the Land parliament to pass a law if this was demanded by a people's petition and supported by the Land people in a referendum, endangered the system of representative democracy as provided by the federal Constitution. This narrow understanding of democratic homogeneity and the negligence of the principle of federalism are critically viewed in the article. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2003
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