Electoral Accountability in a Federal System: National and Provincial Economic Voting in Canada

François Gélineau and Éric Bélanger

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2005, vol. 35, issue 3, 407-424

Abstract: Are federal incumbents punished for national and/or provincial economic performance, and are provincial incumbents held accountable for the state of the provincial and/or national economy? Using a pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of electoral results and macroeconomic data for 1953-2001, this article explores the extent to which provincial and federal incumbents in Canadian elections are affected more by national or provincial economic conditions. The results of the analysis suggest that federal incumbents would not gain many votes by claiming credit for the economic prosperity of any particular province when, on average, national economic conditions are deteriorating. The results further suggest that provincial incumbents are not held accountable for economic conditions in their provinces, but are rather punished for national economic deterioration when the incumbent federal party is of the same partisan family. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2005
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