UK Devolution and the European Union: A Tale of Cooperative Asymmetry?

Simon Bulmer, Martin Burch, Patricia Hogwood and Andrew Scott

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, vol. 36, issue 1, 75-93

Abstract: The post-1999 devolution project has resulted in a major recalibration of the preexisting arrangements for making European Union policy within the United Kingdom. The devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales (but not the English regions) have gained in electoral legitimacy and legislative powers, and thereby have a greater claim to consultation with UK central government. Four key characteristics of European Union policymaking in a devolved United Kingdom are identified. The legal contingency of the “devolveds” status has not yet impeded traditional cooperative relations between government tiers, but the stability of the new arrangements remains in question. The UK case is compared with European Union regionalization in other member states and a distinction is drawn between a cooperative regionalist approach (the devolveds) and a consultative one (the English regions). Copyright , Oxford University Press.

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