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Work Sharing Policy: Power Sharing and Stalemate in American Federalism

David E. Balducchi and Stephen A. Wandner

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2008, vol. 38, issue 1, 111-136

Abstract: Work sharing benefits are partial unemployment benefits, and federal policy related to them is in an administrative muddle. A lack of leadership by the federal government has stalled state implementation. During economic downturns when political voltage is high, policy makers look to work sharing as one way to manage job loss. Conversely, work sharing is often forgotten during prosperous times. This article describes how federalism sometimes facilitates state initiation of work sharing policy and at other times impedes it. The authors discuss work sharing through six policy phases during a thirty-year era of devolving federal authority to states for employment services and job training, and they make observations about the stalemate in federal policy. Copyright 2008, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2008
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Publius: The Journal of Federalism is currently edited by Paul Nolette and Philip Rocco

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