The Politics of Constitutional Change between Reform and Evolution

Nathalie Behnke and Arthur Benz

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2009, vol. 39, issue 2, 213-240

Abstract: In this article, we investigate the dynamics of constitutional policy. Starting from the observation that federal systems are confronted with a two-sided dilemma of stability and flexibility, the question is how necessary constitutional change can be accomplished in spite of special rules of amendment and numerous veto players. We propose an analytical distinction of reform and evolution as two modes of constitutional change that can complement and in part substitute for each other. Comparative research shows that those two modes can effectively account for different patterns of constitutional change and that a two-track mode of constitutional change making use of a flexible interplay of both reform and evolution can best secure federal stability over the long run. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2009
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