Constitutional Change Without Constitutional Reform: Spanish Federalism and the Revision of Catalonia's Statute of Autonomy

César Colino

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2009, vol. 39, issue 2, 262-288

Abstract: This article analyzes the constitutional change in federations that is driven by the bottom-up reform of subnational units' constitutional arrangements as an alternative to the reforms of the federal constitution. Looking at the case of Catalonia's recent reform of its statute of autonomy, it discusses and evaluates some of the benefits and pitfalls of the utilization of substantial subnational constitutional discretion and the likely consequences of this mode of reform for the Spanish model of federalism and others. This is done through the study of the initiation of the Catalan reform process, its content and scope, and through the investigation of the political and institutional factors that account for its occurrence and final outcomes. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2009
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