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What Makes Strong Federalism Seem Weak? Fiscal Resources and Presidential-Provincial Relations in Argentina

Allyson L. Benton

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2009, vol. 39, issue 4, 651-676

Abstract: This article revives an unresolved political debate now masquerading as an empirical puzzle: how can we characterize the nature of Argentine federalism when recent presidential administrations support conflicting conclusions about it? Carlos Saúl Menem (1989-1999) easily pushed through policy changes with the support of governors and provincial delegates in congress, implying that federalism is weak. Fernando De la Rúa (1999-2001) faced considerable provincial and congressional opposition, implying that federalism is strong. To resolve this puzzle, I recast federalism in terms of its economic context. I argue that economic growth renders presidential-provincial relations positive-sum, leading to intergovernmental cooperation and the appearance of weak federalism. Economic decline turns presidential-provincial relations zero-sum, raising intergovernmental conflict, and the appearance of strong federal institutions. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2009
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Publius: The Journal of Federalism is currently edited by Paul Nolette and Philip Rocco

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