Playing the Field: Federalism and the Politics of Venue Shopping in the United States and Canada

John Constantelos

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2010, vol. 40, issue 3, 460-483

Abstract: Research on interest group strategies in federal systems is converging with the venue shopping and multilevel lobbying literature in the European Union. Drawing on both literatures, the article compares the lobbying strategies of U.S. and Canadian interest groups during the economic crisis of 2008--2009. The impact of political institutional and political partisan factors on venue choice is analyzed in a comparative crucial case study of Michigan and Ontario. Statistical analysis of original survey data from ninety-eight business, trade, and professional associations indicates that neither interest group financial resources nor the severity of the crisis predict lobbying frequencies or targets. Two factors strongly influence where interest groups lobby: the relative importance of the government levels and the partisan control of government. Copyright 2010, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2010
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