Comparing Privacy Regimes: Federal Theory and the Politics of Privacy Regulation in the European Union and the United States

Fernando Mendez and Mario Mendez

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2010, vol. 40, issue 4, 617-645

Abstract: This article draws on federal theory to analyze the dynamics of crafting a privacy regime in the European Union and the United States. Three dimensions of the policy domain are analyzed: how policy was framed, the policy dynamics activated, and the policy instruments used. The main finding is that despite obvious differences in the choice of specific policy instruments, a strikingly similar regulatory dynamic and framing of policy can be detected. Two conclusions are drawn: first, federal theory can reveal novel insights on the politics of regulating privacy, especially in relation to new technologies and counter terrorism measures. Second, applying a comparative research design to EU policy-making can help explain many of its apparent empirical puzzles. Copyright 2010, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2010
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