Regime Change and the Federal Gamble: Negotiating Federal Institutions in Brazil, Russia, South Africa, and Spain

Heather L. Tafel

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2011, vol. 41, issue 2, 257-285

Abstract: This article proposes a theoretical framework to explain the negotiated federal outcomes in countries undergoing regime change and investigates its applicability to a diverse set of countries--Brazil, Russia, South Africa, and Spain. It considers the intersection of reform strategies, the normative and organizational preferences of constituencies enlisted for regime negotiations, and the conflicts associated with regime change. Two key variables--the balance of power and violence predictions--translate actors' preferences into federal institutional outcomes. A comparative case study analysis evaluates the argument and demonstrates the conditions under which regime reform strategies have a more direct impact on intergovernmental bargaining venues and why some shifts in the balance of power have led to more substantive institutional concessions. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2011
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