The Politics of Appeasement? Politics and Federal Financial Disbursements: The Case of Ethiopia

John Ishiyama

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2012, vol. 42, issue 1, 1-24

Abstract: This article tests three different hypotheses regarding the political motivations for federal financial disbursements (the "swing" hypothesis, the "reward" hypothesis, and the "appeasement" hypothesis) using the case of Ethiopia following the 2005 parliamentary elections. Using an original data set on financial disbursements, election results, and social, economic, and demographic data from the level of the administrative districts and the election constituencies in Ethiopia, it is found that the appeasement hypothesis best explains federal disbursements. Further, it is suggested that these disbursement patterns directly affected the outcome of the subsequent 2010 parliamentary election. Copyright 2012, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2012
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