Nullification and the Political, Legal, and Quasi-Legal Constitutions

Bradley D. Hays

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2013, vol. 43, issue 2, 205-226

Abstract: In the midst of the nullification crisis, southern states sympathetic to South Carolina's position on the tariff rejected the doctrine of nullification. They did so because nullification rejected interpretive pluralism and discursive practices associated with political constitutionalism. Rather, Calhounian nullification and state interpretive supremacy reflected elements of legal constitutionalism but refashioned into a quasi-legal constitutionalism, which served state supremacy and minoritarianism. Scrutinizing nullification's rejection provides insight into the role of federalism in constitutional politics, including contemporary state expressions of constitutional dissent. State officials who suggest constitutional infidelity to advance policy concerns mistake an inclusive dialogic tradition with a rejected authority to dictate constitutional policy to the nation. Copyright 2013, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2013
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