Portfolio Allocation under Decentralization

Albert Falcó-Gimeno

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2014, vol. 44, issue 1, 205-225

Abstract: Decentralization shapes the way policy authority is shared between the national and regional levels and that, I argue, will have consequences for government formation. In particular, I contend that the allocation of portfolios in regional coalition governments will be affected by the degree of decentralization of each policy. To analyze this relationship I exploit the cross-time, cross-regional, and cross-policy variation of the process of competence devolution to the Spanish Autonomous Communities between 1980 and 2010. I find that, as expected, an increase in the competences managed by the region in a given policy jurisdiction makes the related portfolio more attractive to all coalition parties, although the effect seems to be particularly significant in economically strong and fast-track regions. Copyright 2014, Oxford University Press.

Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/publius/pjt027 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:publus:v:44:y:2014:i:1:p:205-225

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Publius: The Journal of Federalism is currently edited by Paul Nolette and Philip Rocco

More articles in Publius: The Journal of Federalism from CSF Associates Inc. Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().