The Federalist and V. Ostrom on Concurrent Taxation and Federalism

John Kincaid

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2014, vol. 44, issue 2, 275-297

Abstract: Vincent Ostrom viewed concurrent federal and state taxation as a key element of the theory of the compound republic. Alexander Hamilton viewed his theory of concurrent tax jurisdiction elaborated in The Federalist as an important intellectual achievement and device for convincing readers that the new federal government needed, and could be entrusted with, an unhampered tax power because citizens would be able to control that power through their House of Representatives, federal taxes would ordinarily be moderate, and the states would retain their sovereign tax powers. Furthermore, the dual federalism arising from this concurrent jurisdiction would be cooperative in two important respects: the federal and state governments would practice mutual forbearance in tax policy making, and the federal government would employ state officers for tax collection.

Date: 2014
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