Federalism and Welfare to Work in Switzerland: The Development of Active Social Policies in a Fragmented Welfare State

Giuliano Bonoli and Cyrielle Champion

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2015, vol. 45, issue 1, 77-98

Abstract: This article is concerned with the impact that federal structures have on the development of welfare to work or activation policies. More precisely, it argues that the incentives and the risks associated with a division of responsibilities among different jurisdictions may constitute an obstacle to broad reforms that promote labor market participation of nonworking benefit recipients. This argument is illustrated with a case study discussing policy responses to a massive rise in caseloads among social assistance recipients in Switzerland. We conclude that the lack of a fundamental reform was the consequence of the incentives provided by the federal structure of the program. These incentives have both encouraged cost shifting among jurisdictions and discouraged involvement of federal level policy makers in a bigger reform.

Date: 2015
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/publius/pju025 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:publus:v:45:y:2015:i:1:p:77-98.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Publius: The Journal of Federalism is currently edited by Paul Nolette and Philip Rocco

More articles in Publius: The Journal of Federalism from CSF Associates Inc. Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().