Dynamic De/Centralization in the United States, 1790–2010

John Kincaid

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2019, vol. 49, issue 1, 166-193

Abstract: Part of a project measuring dynamic de/centralization across twenty-two policy fields and five fiscal indicators in six federations from their founding to 2010, this study finds slow but continual U.S. centralization in all fields followed by a mild centralization spurt during the 1930s and substantial acceleration during the 1960s and 1970s. Little fiscal centralization is found, except for increased conditions attached to federal aid. The principal instruments of centralization have been Congress and the Supreme Court; the principal political agents have been political parties and interest groups responding to opportunities created by exogenous forces such as market integration and technological change.

Date: 2019
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