Mind the Gap between the Governor and the People: The Common Agency Problem in Russian Authoritarian Federalism

Stanislav Klimovich

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2023, vol. 53, issue 2, 301-324

Abstract: Since the revival of direct gubernatorial elections in 2012, regional governors in Russia have two formal principals: the president and the people of the region. The principal–agent theory defines this situation as a common agency problem. In the context of authoritarian federalism, direct elections pose a two-fold challenge to Vladimir Putin’s vertical power. First, even if manipulated, elections can lead to unpredictable outcomes for the federal center. Second, in the long run, popular legitimacy incentivizes regional leaders to become more independent from the Kremlin. This study argues that the federal center in Russia has addressed the common agency problem not only by limiting the freedom of choice for the local populations through restrictive electoral law, but also by adopting a recruitment pattern that prefers outsider governors who lack personal connection to the regions of service. An original dataset on regional governors’ selection in 2012–2018 provides empirical evidence for this claim.

Date: 2023
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