Federalism, Decentral Governance, and Joint Decision-Making: Bad News for the Implementation of International Environmental Agreements?

Johannes Müller Gómez

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2024, vol. 54, issue 2, 407-433

Abstract: There is a lingering myth in the international compliance literature that domestic multilevel structures have a negative impact on the fulfilment of international commitments. This article argues that this literature has failed to understand multilevel structures as a multi-layered concept. Instead of viewing multilevel governance as a one-dimensional concept or a mere system of veto-players, I propose to study the effects of the individual components, i.e., federalism, decentral governance, and joint decision-making. I test the plausibility of this approach by analyzing the implementation of the Ramsar Wetlands Convention. My findings debunk the myth about the negative effects of multilevel structures on the implementation of international agreements. I show that states in which subnational decision-makers can act autonomously from the central level are better placed to produce implementation measures in the area of environmental conservation.

Date: 2024
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