EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Federal Judges, States Legislators, and State Voting Rights Rollback

Robinson Wood

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2024, vol. 54, issue 3, 465-486

Abstract: This article claims that recent Supreme Court decisions have allowed state lawmakers to suppress and skew but not subvert the vote. The Court relaxed federal oversight of state election administration in Shelby County v. Holder (2013), Abbott v. Perez (2018), and Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee (2021), and gerrymandering in Rucho v. Common Cause (2019), while prohibiting independent state legislative election regulation in Moore v. Harper (2023). These decisions guided state lawmakers toward vote suppression and skewing, and away from election subversion. Consequently, Republican state legislatures have passed state constitutional amendments and statutes limiting ballot access and reforming state redistricting practices. While some Democratic state legislatures have protected ballot access and independent redistricting, these recent Supreme Court decisions help Republicans win a disproportionate share of state legislative seats. National courts thus help preserve the national party coalition by opening subnational jurisdictions to party entrenchment.

Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/publius/pjae018 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:publus:v:54:y:2024:i:3:p:465-486.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Publius: The Journal of Federalism is currently edited by Paul Nolette and Philip Rocco

More articles in Publius: The Journal of Federalism from CSF Associates Inc. Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:oup:publus:v:54:y:2024:i:3:p:465-486.