What Explains German Länder Governments’ Stances Towards Federalism?

Salvatore Barbaro and Julia M Rode

Publius: The Journal of Federalism, 2025, vol. 55, issue 2, 325-352

Abstract: In federal systems, subnational governments often take highly asymmetric positions on questions of self-rule and shared rule. The German case is emblematic of this dynamic, as some state governments assert their primary role in legislative functions while others highlight the benefits of coordinated and uniform decision-making. Although the existing literature recognizes these differences, it often fails to fully disentangle the underlying reasons for this variation. This article examines several factors shaping the divergent positions of Länder, including historical legacies, party ideology, and cultural and religious differences. Our findings indicate that financial capacity is a key determinant of Länder governments’ stances on federalism questions.

Keywords: Germany; federalism stances; Prussian legacy; financial strength (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/publius/pjae050 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:oup:publus:v:55:y:2025:i:2:p:325-352.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://academic.oup.com/journals

Access Statistics for this article

Publius: The Journal of Federalism is currently edited by Paul Nolette and Philip Rocco

More articles in Publius: The Journal of Federalism from CSF Associates Inc. Oxford University Press, Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Oxford University Press ().